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Abstract: How sexuality should be regulated in a liberal political community is an important, controversial theoretical
and empirical question—as shown by the recent criminalization of possession of some adult pornography in the United
Kingdom. Supporters of criminalization argue that Mill, often considered a staunch opponent of censorship, would support
prohibition due to his feminist commitments. I argue that this account underestimates the strengths of theMillian account of
private conduct and free expression, and the consistency ofMillian anticensorship with feminist values. AMillian contextual
defense of liberty, however, suggests several other policy approaches to addressing the harms of pornography.
What place does pornography have in a liberalsociety?1 Williams (1979), in his role aschair of the British Home Office Committee
on Obscenity and Film Censorship, famously bound
Mill’s harm principle to a defense of pornography, and
Millian thought has been central to this debate ever
since. Some feminist critics of pornography offer a new
pro-censorship Millian account, supported by Mill’s
commitments to women’s emancipation and aversion to
humanity’s animalistic sexual appetites (McGlynn and
Rackley 2009;McGlynn andWard 2014).While other the-
orists reject aspects of a liberal framework in order to jus-
tify censorship (Langton 2009a; MacKinnon 1993, 2001),
this new Millian argument extends the debate because it
uses liberal premises to justify regulating highly personal
expression.
The prohibition of “extreme pornography” in the
United Kingdom (Criminal Justice and Immigration Act
2008) and its recent extension (Criminal Justice and
Courts Act 2015) inspired and invigorated this argument
for censorship. The law was introduced with the express
intention of protecting women from the harm of pornog-
raphy (Carline 2011). It bans the possession of obscene
and explicit depictions of the following: nonconsensual
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1In order to avoid a circular argument over definitions (Dworkin 2006, 300), I follow the prevailing working definition of pornography as
sexually explicit material intended to arouse (McGlynn and Ward 2014).
sexual penetration; acts that appear to threaten a person’s
life; acts that inflict serious harm on the breasts, geni-
talia, or anus; and acts of necrophilia and bestiality.While
many images falling under this definition offend and dis-
turb people, liberal opponents are concerned that the
prohibition includes fictional representations, in particu-
lar, depictions of common sexual fantasy scenarios (Joyal,
Cossette, and Lapierre 2015), as well as a range of sex acts
that may appear subjectively dangerous or degrading, but
are safe and frequently enjoyed when practiced between
informed, consenting adults. Theprohibition targets peo-
ple for possessing depictions of sex acts, rather than in-
volvement in real acts that are either seriously harmful or
nonconsensual (Murray 2009). It applies characteristics
of existing law regulating publication to cases involving
private possession (Attwood andWalters 2013, 977). As a
result, even personal images, depicting intimate encoun-
ters with a partner, can be criminalized.
The prosecution of Simon Walsh, in August 2012,
illustrates this problem. The Crown Prosecution Service
for England and Wales charged him with possession of
several photographic images taken at a private sex party,
in which he participated, that depicted allegedly harm-
ful acts of “fisting” and “urethral sounding” (Rackley and
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McGlynn2013).Walshwas acquitted following expert de-
fense evidence suggesting that the acts depicted were rel-
atively safe. However, the process outed Walsh as gay and
derailed his professional career, including a legal practice
that had specialized in investigating corruption within
British police forces, and public life, as an aide to the
mayor of London (Attwood and Walters 2013, 975).
The Crown Prosecution Service maintains that the
acts depicted were “extreme” even if the jury disagreed
in this case, suggesting they see this kind of prosecu-
tion as in line with government policy. This illustrates
the difficulty that prosecutors have had interpreting the
law. There are particular legal vulnerabilities for sexual
minorities, including individuals with a lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual or transgender orientation, and practitioners of
bondage, domination and sadomasochism. More than a
thousand prosecutions happen annually (Crown Prose-
cution Service 2015, 92). In contrast to these observed
harms arising from prosecution, there is comparatively
little evidence that allowing access to extreme pornog-
raphy causes or encourages violence against women, or
is associated with specific social harms (Diamond 2009;
Ferguson and Hartley 2009; cf. Itzin, Taket, and Kelly
2007). Nevertheless, feminist supporters of the law,
though critical of its implementation in particular cases,
including that ofWalsh, argue for the principle of censor-
ship using Millian liberal premises.
TheMillian Case for Censorship
The Williams report made Millian principles of free ex-
pression (1979, 53) and the harm principle (1979, 57) a
corepart of the liberal defenseof sexually explicitmaterial.
The report criticized the application of the legal notion of
“obscenity” as unworkable and subjective (1979, 11), and
drew attention to the lack of evidence of specific harms,
especially sexual offenses, associated with the availability
of pornography (1979, 79). The report did not advo-
cate a laissez-faire policy, instead endorsing regulations
on displays of pornography to prevent public offense and
to protect children from inappropriate material (1979,
130). However, the report argued that criminal prohibi-
tion should be restricted to material created by inflicting
actual physical harm or by exploiting underage actors
(1979, 161).
The pro-censorship case argues that this liberal ap-
proach endorses metaphysically unjustified “absolute”
(McGlynn and Ward 2014, 520), “abstract” (McGlynn
and Ward 2009, 339), “a priori” (Dyzenhaus 1992b, 546)
rights to privacy and free expression and that the lib-
eral approach relies on an impoverished conception of
“direct” harm that denies the real harms and injustice of
pornographic expression beyond that directly associated
with its production (McGlynn andWard2014, 503).Once
these abstractions are dismissed, those in favor of censor-
ship suggest that liberals can approach questions of free
expression and individual liberty on a more contingent,
case-by-case basis (McGlynn andWard 2009, 341). Liber-
als should acknowledge the existence of “cultural harm,”
namely, harms that contribute to a “social environment in
which sexual violence is marginalised, in which rape con-
viction rates are at an all time low and in which pornog-
raphy is becoming (if possible) even more ubiquitous”
(McGlynn and Rackley 2010, 9). A Millian, on this ac-
count, should endorse this approach becauseMill himself
does not systematically define harm, nor a way of dealing
with conflicts between liberties (McGlynnandWard2014,
506). Moreover, reading the “Applications” section ofOn
Liberty, and The Subjection of Women provides plenty of
exceptions to any notional “harm principle” (Dyzenhaus
1992b, 534; McGlynn and Ward 2014, 506). The pro-
censorship case adds thatpornography, especially extreme
pornography, cannot conceivably be valuable expression,
and so liberals should commend its prohibition.
If successful, this case justifies censorship on a broad
basis, impacting not just on expression made in public
but also ideas shared in private (indeed intimate) set-
tings. This could render prosecutions such as Walsh’s an
unfortunate but, potentially, necessary part of the process
of a political community deliberating and discovering the
shared boundaries of acceptable behavior (cf. Johnson
2010). If the case fails, then the ban loses an important
normative justification and may appear more like a sheer
exercise of state power with the reactionary function of
punishing alleged sexual deviancy (Carline 2011) and re-
inforcing some sexualminority practices as taboo (Tebble
2011).
My case for the latter is as follows.Millian2 liberalism
sees rights as political, not metaphysical. Critiquing the
ontological status of rights does not impact straightfor-
wardly on the content of the rights that aMillian defends.
The harm principle affirms a tractable set of rights that
includes possession of extreme pornography. Rather than
rendering the harm principle indeterminate, the “Appli-
cations” section ofOnLibertyhelps to establish its bound-
aries by explaining what counts as private conduct to be
protected fromstate intrusion.Moreover,Mill’s argument
in The Subjection of Women does not support censorship.
2By “Millian,” I mean the theoretical approach that we can plausi-
bly infer fromMill’s writing. I critique the pro-censorship account’s
textual arguments rather than their speculation about what a his-
torical Mill might have thought about extreme pornography in a
contemporary context (McGlynn and Ward 2014, 518).
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A Millian anticensorship position stands not on af-
firming rights in the abstract, but on critical observations
of what happens when governments censor. In the case
of pornography, regulation addressing “cultural harm”
leads authorities to punish arbitrarily members of sex-
ual minority groups for the crimes and social problems
of the rest of the community. Moreover, far from be-
ing valueless, queer feminist accounts of pornography,
even extreme pornography, acknowledge its role in ed-
ucation and self-development, including the affirmation
of alternative sexual identities. These accounts suggest
that Millian defenses of free expression are applicable to
sexually explicit expression. The anticensorship position
does not affirm unlimited rights to free expression, but
proposes boundaries that rule out certain kinds of state
intervention, including the ban on extreme pornography
as presently constituted.
Mill’s Political Conception of Rights
Rejecting both the practical possibility and legitimacy
of rights to privacy and free expression are critical ele-
ments of the pro-censorship case. In making their case,
McGlynn and Ward establish a dichotomy between lib-
eral fundamentalists and liberal humanists (or pragma-
tists). For them, the liberal fundamentalist position rests
on shaky foundations, conceptual and historical, and af-
firms ontologically suspect “abstract rights” (2009, 339).
Pragmatists, by contrast, will not let such “abstruse dis-
tractions” get in the way of addressing “real harms and
real injustices” in a liberal community (2009, 350). En-
dorsing Rorty’s (1991) stance that “to say something is
right or wrong, just or unjust, is merely to say that it does
or does not conform to current social practice” (McGlynn
and Ward 2009, 339), they propose:
[The pragmatist has] little time for those who
peddle the insinuation that the proscription of
pornography might have a “chilling effect” on
some sort of allusive “right” of free speech. Nei-
ther will she fall prey to the juristic miasma of
causal harm.Thepragmatics ofmaking life better
should never be sacrificed on the altar of juristic
abstraction. (2009, 343)
McGlynn andWard claimMill to the pragmatist side
of their distinction. They suggest that liberal fundamen-
talists apply “a crude version of Mill’s Harm Principle”
(2009, 344), and that instead “Mill was never dogmatic in
his thinking; he embraced complexity and compromise,”
and “it is to the subtle, accommodating and pragmatic
Mill to whom we should turn, not the Mill whose car-
icature is commonly discerned in so much libertarian
thought” (2014, 522).
This account has compelling aspects, but the dis-
tinction between “fundamentalism” and “pragmatism”
has its own critical weaknesses. Mill is not a libertar-
ian, and the thesis in On Liberty simultaneously restricts
and legitimates government action: “The interference
of government is, with about equal frequency, improp-
erly invoked and improperly condemned” (1977, 223).
McGlynn and Ward correctly differentiate the Millian
approach from Dworkin’s (2013), which conceptualizes
“rights as trumps,” essentially antimajoritarian claims
against a democratic conception of the good. Zivi finds
that both supporters and detractors alike have mistak-
enly assumed this approach to Mill is the only possible
interpretation (2006, 52). McGlynn and Ward’s weak-
ness is, having attached rights to liberal fundamentalism,
a failure to recognize alternative approaches to concep-
tualizing rights. While Mill explicitly rejects “the idea of
abstract right” (1977a, 224), he nevertheless has a key role
for rights within his framework: “a recognition of certain
immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it
was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to
infringe” (1977a, 218).
In contrast to McGlynn and Ward, Zivi (2006) sug-
gests that rights claims are not the captives of apolitical
abstractions but can act instead as an effective discur-
sive strategy for addressing real harms and injustices. She
argues that as well as risks, there are opportunities and
benefits to using rights claims because of their persua-
sive means in solving practical social problems, and not
because of their capacity to impose certain metaphysical
assumptions on political discussion (Zivi 2012, 115; cf.
Mill 1977a, 224). Rights claiming need not be antidemo-
cratic, but instead a part of democratic politics (Zivi
2012, 59). Against this account, it is not enough, even
as a pragmatist, to dismiss rights as mere “contingen-
cies,” disposable social fictions. For a pragmatist, every
concept is a social fiction, so there is nothing especially
problematic about invoking rights as part of a political
argument.
Similarly, Dyzenhaus argues that even if a Millian
wants to protect a right to privacy, she has no a priori
definition of “private action” definitively exempted from
the state’s evaluation (1992b, 546). This is true but trivial
once we acknowledge rights as political, not metaphysi-
cal. A Millian has few, if any, a priori claims to make. It
is only within that framework that a Millian argues for
acknowledging rights such as privacy as a fundamental
aspect of human development and security. As a result, it
is possible for a Millian to disavow some interpretations
that rely on unjustifiable metaphysical claims and yet,
on practical grounds, advocate rights to privacy and free
512 NICK COWEN
expression. In the next section, I examine the practical
implications of those rights.
Privacy, Free Expression,
and the Harm Principle
A Millian liberal framework defends tractable notions
of private conduct and free expression. While Mill him-
self did not comment on the issue of pornography, this
framework implies a right to possess and share pornog-
raphy that consenting adults produce (at least in private,
voluntary, noncommercial settings).
Mill advanced his famous statement of legitimate
government action in the formofwhatwas later coined by
Feinberg (1987) as “the harmprinciple.” That is, “the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others” (Mill 1977a, 223). This phrase
seems to permit many interpretations, to the extent that
“Mill is associated . . . with a wide range of views, to wit,
everything from a conventional, and potentially illiberal,
defence of ‘reasonable’ public dialogue to a radically lib-
ertarian defence of absolute freedom of expressing and
publishing opinions” (Riley 2005, 148–49).
As a result, interpreters differ on the clarity in Mill’s
thinking. Reeves claims that “Mill’s philosophical vision
derives both its power and its weakness from his various
attempts to knit together a number of diverse threads”
and, as a result, attempts “to construct a coherent system
from [Mill’s] voluminous writings” are fruitless (2007,
50). By contrast, Gray argues that “Mill’s writings con-
tain a coherent and forceful utilitarian defence of liberal
principles about the right to liberty” (1996, 12) and that
while
[Mill’s doctrine] cannot mechanically resolve all
questions to do with interference with liberty,
[it] does supply a framework of considerations in
terms of which such questions may be discussed.
More incisively, it rules out from the discussion
a whole range of considerations still widely in-
voked as germane to it. (1996, 18)
McGlynn and Ward come down decisively against
this interpretation. They argue, following Bellamy (1992,
26), thatMill provides nomeans of reconciling competing
interests “where there is a conflict of liberties” (McGlynn
andWard 2014, 506), and that he “provided no definition
as to what might constitute ‘harm’” (2014, 505). I suggest
that, while the philosophical grounds for Mill’s position
are inevitably contested, the practical outcomes are easier
to discern.
Private Conduct
“Harm” can indeed include almost any behavior that dis-
advantages someone in some way. What critics tend to
miss is the crucial condition of harm to others. The harm
principle is about self-regarding action and personal con-
duct between consenting adults: “There is no roomfor en-
tertaining any such question [of state interference] when
a person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons be-
sides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like
(all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordi-
nary amount of understanding)” (1977a, 276). This sets
out a consistent limit on state action, applying to things
like the possession of pornography as well as consensual
sexual activities used to create it. It is equivalent, as Guest
(2008, 118) proposes, to “cases where someone has pro-
duced a drug (e.g., growing cannabis) for their own use,”
where more complex questions surrounding social and
commercial interactions are not present.
By contrast, when Dyzenhaus argues for censorship
of pornography on Millian grounds, he offers support
for “any coercion whether state initiated or by dint of in-
formal public pressure, aimed at suppressing production,
distribution, and consumption of pornography” (1992b,
534). This is a general description, both in terms of the
methods justified, as well as the activities to be discour-
aged or suppressed. The implication is that thesemethods
are all, in principle, legitimate actions according to aMil-
lian account if they help to eradicate pornography. His
justification is thatMill’s concerns extend to the intimate,
including relationships within households (1992b, 546–
47). This is true. Instead of the threshold of the house-
hold, it is the harm principle itself that establishes the
legitimate scope of government action, which Mill notes
is sadly absent in the case of domestic relationships:
The State, while it respects the liberty of each
in what specially regards himself, is bound to
maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of
any power which it allows him to possess over
others. This obligation is almost entirely disre-
garded in the case of the family relations, a case,
in its direct influence on human happiness,more
important than all others taken together. (Mill
1977a, 301)
This is consistent with Mill’s concerns about the
domestic subordination of women, as familial partners
and dependents are often exposed to abusive situations.
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However, it remains consistent with a principle of privacy.
This goes beyond, as Gaus (1983) explains, a classical lib-
eralism that sees individual rights as inextricably bound
up with private property rights (Medearis 2005). Instead,
more in linewith contemporary liberal theorists,Mill sees
individual interests as important but separate fromclaims
on private property (Levy 2003, 278). This is a flexible,
contingent conception of the division of the public and
the private. For this reason, a Millian can view the “per-
sonal as political” in some domains precisely to criticize
existing legal definitions of the private. She nevertheless
believes that private conduct should be an acknowledged
political category and protected from state intrusion.
We could reject this distinction between the public
and theprivate and claim that evenwhenviewingpornog-
raphy looks purely self-regarding, it inevitably impacts on
the social environment in a way that could be harmful.
McGlynn and Ward suggest we “recall the lessons which
can be drawn from the ‘applications of Mill’s ‘harm prin-
ciple’, particularly his willingness to recommend the reg-
ulation of behaviour and activity which raise ‘only’ the
risk of future harm” (2014, 520). However, these policies
refer specifically to cases where the interests of dependent
family members, especially children, are in the balance
(Mill 1977a, 304). This is a qualitatively different case
from adults watching or engaging in consensual sex acts.
By describing these scenarios, Mill shows that rights do
not release individuals from positive obligations that they
may have incurred (e.g., by getting married or having
children).Mill distinguishes here between protecting civil
liberties and “misplaced notions of liberty” (1977a, 304)
that permit vice regardless of harm to others. Another
example of this intuition could be that a personal right to
smoke marijuana does not extend to the right to drive a
car while under the influence of marijuana.
The problem with extending the case for regulation
beyond applications regarding dependents is that it does
not secure much space for private conduct at all. By con-
trast,Mill is keen to differentiate between “acts and habits
which are not social, but individual” (1977a, 288). He
places, as an example, drinking alcohol in the category of
individual acts but the act of selling alcohol in the cate-
gory of social acts. He explicitly rejects those who wish to
subject private actions to the nebulous “social rights” of
others:
. . . the like of which probably never before found
its way into distinct language: being nothing
short of this—that it is the absolute social right
of every individual, that every other individual
shall act in every respect exactly as he ought;
that whosoever fails thereof in the smallest
particular, violates my social right, and entitles
me to demand from the legislature the removal
of the grievance. So monstrous a principle is
far more dangerous than any single interference
with liberty. (Mill 1977a, 288)
So Mill does not accept current distinctions between
the private and the public as natural, nor does he re-
ject all notions of privacy altogether, but argues for the
legitimate scope of private actions as those specific ac-
tivities that do not, practically, impose any behavior
on anyone who has not explicitly chosen to participate
(Vernon 1996, 628). Drinking alcohol is protected even if
many related activities, including the sale of alcohol, are
subject to legitimate regulation.McGlynn andWardpoint
out that Mill supports severe and escalating penalties for
violent drunks (2014, 509). Of course, as soon as violence
enters the equation, we are no longer in the realm of
Millian private conduct. The overall result of the discus-
sion of “applications” is to show quite explicitly precisely
what McGlynn and Ward wish to reject. Harm, whether
through an act of commission or omission, must have
some verifiable impact on individuals. It must “violate a
distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or
persons” (Mill 1977a, 281) in order for it no longer to
be self-regarding (Ten 1968, 32). It cannot relate to an
unverifiable social interest.
Free Expression
The harm principle protects some activities associated
with consuming pornography, namely, those that take
place exclusively in private spaces between consenting
adults. The question of publication is more complex.
When criticizing libel, for example, it is not strictly the
existence of regulation that Mill opposes. Instead, it is the
broad discretion given to judges and the criminal rather
than civil approach that attract his criticisms (Mill 1984,
22–25). When defending freedom of the press, Mill ex-
cludes speech that creates an imminent risk of violence
(Riley 2010, 80).
The right to freedom of speech has often been taken
to be derivative of the harm principle. Reflecting this
common view, Murray’s (2009) analysis of the case for
outlawing extreme pornography includes a demand for
evidence of physical harm associated with pornography
use. He takes the evidential bar to be proof that viewing
pornography can be excluded from a right to freedom of
expression that is otherwise assumed to be nonharmful.
However, we know from the account of private conduct
that speech is not intrinsically nonharmful. Public
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expression is a social act (Kateb 1996a, 227; Riley 2005a,
176). A Millian instead defends free expression on a
utilitarian basis rather than referring back to the harm
principle. Exercising free speech can disturb people, but
“the benefits of free discussion and of the open struggle
between competing conceptions of the good life outweigh
the costs of such confrontation” (Waldron 1987, 423).
We can account for the common elision of the right to
free speech and the harm principle by the fact that there is
significant overlap both in theory and practice. For Mill,
freedom of thought and discussion is “a single branch”
of a “general thesis” (1977a, 227), and some elements
of expression are “practically inseparable” (1977a, 226)
from freedom of thought (Guest 2008). Thought is, of
course, self-regarding. Furthermore, it is not the interest
of those expressing ideas that count but the benefit of
those able tohear different opinions (Mill 1977a, 242–45).
In contemporary terms, this right of listeners represents a
sort of freedom of information, amounting to the notion
that the law should not normally come between a willing
speaker and a willing audience, or indeed, in the case of
thought itself, interfere with someone expressing ideas
absent an audience, a case of testimonial freedom (Cohen
2006).
On the other hand, if it is primarily the right of the
audience, then the right to expression does not extend to
a limitless and absolute right to be heard. This indicates a
distinction between expressionmade in closed settings—
whether churches, assemblies, or safe spaces with their
own rules of order—and expression broadcast or made
in a public space. The presence of disturbing ideas in
civil society is both inevitable and valuable for a Millian,
but people are not obligated to witness them, and this
seems particularly pertinent for violent or explicit sexual
content: “To prevent serious forms of perceptible damage
that nobody should be forced to suffer, laws of justice
should include time, place and manner restrictions that
distribute equal rights not to be confronted or bothered
by speakers” (Riley 2010, 80). While a Millian framework
cannot be read to support a free speech “absolutism,” a
pro-censorship reading of On Liberty stretches it beyond
recognition.
Against this position, Dyzenhaus contends that “lib-
erals who regard Mill as the founder of their tradi-
tion should reevaluate their position on pornography in
light of Mill’s curiously neglected essay The Subjection
of Women” (1992b, 534). For Dyzenhaus, Mill’s critique
of Victorian society runs much deeper than legal institu-
tions: “Mill does not see legally prescribed inequalities be-
tweenmen and women as muchmore than de jure recog-
nition of de facto social relationships based ultimately on .
. . the superior physical power ofmales” (1992b, 538).That
is, the subordination of women is founded on coercion,
but, as it turns out, is all the more insidious and perni-
cious because it takes on the guise of consent. Women are
trained to become the “willing slaves” of men—indeed,
to find submission tomen an attractive prospect. Pornog-
raphy’s function, in this account, is to eroticize unequal
relations betweenmen andwomen, thus altering the pref-
erences of men and women toward sexuality.
However, interpreting The Subjection of Women in
light of a Millian framework suggests that Dyzenhaus’s
argument is flawed if the intention is to justify censorship
rather than the use of persuasion, and social opprobrium,
to change attitudes towardwomen.Mill discusses the sub-
ordinate and sycophantic representation of women in lit-
erature, but not to argue that it plays a significant causal
role in women’s oppression. It is a reflection of the le-
gal position that women are actually in (1984, 279). He
shows that many popular beliefs about women are a re-
flection of discrimination, not a compelling justification
for that discrimination. The problem with relations be-
tween men and women taking on the guise of consent is
that, in Mill’s context especially, consent really is always
absent because women’s consent to a whole range of per-
sonal and economic choices is ultimately not required,
not even formally in law (1984, 292). It is not a case of
women being persuaded, or having their personalities ul-
timately determined, to be subordinate to men. Instead,
their subordinate stance and meek demeanor ameliorate
positions into which they have, in fact, been forced with
the threat of legalized violence.
If Mill had supported censorship, of women’s liter-
ature or anything else, in The Subjection of Women, in
the hope of improving women’s social status, then that
would be a historically puzzling departure from the Mil-
lian framework. However, Mill did not propose censor-
ship as a solution, suggesting that a Millian approach
could be both radically feminist and anticensorship. Are
these two elements consistent? In the next section, I sug-
gest they are by showing the parallels betweenMillian an-
ticensorship and contemporary queer feminist defenses
of sexually explicit expression.
TheMillian Alternative
to Prohibition
Rights justified in political, not metaphysical, terms
must inevitably stand on some practical human interest.
Adumbrating rights within a Millian framework and
pointing out inter alia that they protect the possession
and creation of adult consensual pornography, including
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consensual extreme pornography, is arguably insufficient
to make my defense ultimately persuasive. As McGlynn
and Ward argue, “Mill . . . would have been exercised in
the extreme by the supposition that his essay ‘on liberty’
should be used to institutionalise the cultural degradation
and jurisprudential inequality of women” (2009, 336).
If that is all that defending extreme pornography from
criminal prohibition achieves, then I risk falling into the
liberal fundamentalist trap that privileges abstract legal
notions over real human interests.
I propose that rights do not represent abstruse con-
straints, as the pro-censorship case sees them, on effective
action to oppose misogynist and other harmful forms of
expression.When affirmed appropriately, these rights en-
able effective state action and, more substantially, gener-
ate the social circumstances inwhich voluntary action can
address the harms of some pornography. These rights al-
low people, including theorists, activists, porn producers,
porn consumers, and sex workers, to affirm and dissemi-
nate alternative positive visions of human sexuality.When
the state censors, by contrast, these activities are all too
easily silenced and prohibited.
The Limits and Capacities of Criminal
Regulation
My anticensorship approach acknowledges the limits
of the effectiveness and benevolence of coercive state
intervention (Gaus 2010, 91) and endorses a “focus on
how institutions perform under worst-case conditions”
(Farrant and Crampton 2008, 118), including govern-
ment action. A Millian criticizes theorists who rely
on judging institutions only at their most attractive
moments: “Whether the institution to be defended is
slavery, political absolutism, or the absolutism of the
head of a family, we are always expected to judge of it
from its best instances” (Mill 1984, 287). It is with these
“robustness considerations” (Farrant and Crampton
2008) in mind that Millians reject traditional forms of
power, especially patriarchal power, while simultaneously
affirming the importance of individual rights against
the modern state. For a policy regime to be worthy of
defense, it shouldwork reasonably well without assuming
the benevolence of those tasked with enforcing it: “The
British constitution supposes that rulers always wish to
abuse their power and . . . wish to remove every check
which has a tendency to prevent them from abusing their
power” (Mill 1984, 19; cf. Kateb 1996, 231).
While these particular claims are made in classical
liberal language, there is a complementary state-skeptical
and critical tradition running through much contempo-
rary feminism, and this applies particularly to criminal
justice approaches. Howe (2013) argues it is important to
consider the outcomes, rather than just the pronounced
intentions, of laws in order to understand their regula-
tory function. Bernstein (2012; cf. Bumiller 2013, 197)
criticizes the phenomenon of “carceral feminism,” where
political actors co-opt feminist concerns in order to ex-
tend the coercive reach of the criminal law, not with the
effect of making women safer but extending state power,
whereas Bumiller advises us “to be aware of both the po-
tentialities and limitations of using state power to advance
the interests of women” (2008, 2).
The pro-censorship case discounts the likelihood of
the state misusing its powers in the case of the extreme
pornography ban.McGlynn andRackley argue that abuse
is unlikely because “proceedings for an offence may not
be instituted without the consent of the DPP [Director of
Public Prosecutions]” (2009, 255).3 AMillian skepticism,
by contrast, sees relying on the judgment of a single public
official to be problematic, a concern that prosecutors’ use
of this law in practice has somewhat vindicated.McGlynn
and Ward argue instead that defending extreme pornog-
raphy is a sadistic application of rights claims (2009, 341).
In their account, skepticism of criminal intervention in-
volves permitting women’s degradation on the basis of
abstract, imaginary concerns with state power. However,
when applied against individuals, the law itself could un-
intentionally legitimize another example of sadism: the
evident satisfaction that many people experience from
punishing and humiliating sexual deviants, quite typi-
cally gays and lesbians (cf. Ross 2000, 305; Strossen 2000,
231). McGlynn et al. wish to address “cultural harm,”
but a “culture” itself cannot be convicted or incarcerated
(nor can “speech” as such). Criminal legal intervention
requires an individual to punish.
As a result, criminal law that presumes to address cul-
tural problems requires individuals to stand in,potentially
as scapegoats, for the harms imputed to a wider culture:
“The users of extreme pornography are the legitimate
targets—theymust take responsibility for themarket they
create in materials which often glorify sexual violence
against women” (McGlynn and Rackley 2010, 10–11). I
suggest that the sheer variety of people who create and
possess extreme pornography renders this process of se-
lecting individuals to punish for “cultural” crimes deeply
problematic. That prosecutors have ended up treating gay
3Waldron (2014) makes a similar suggestion that prosecutorial dis-
cretion can prevent problematic speech regulation. Interestingly,
the Crown Prosecution Service for England and Wales deny this
consent clause gives significant discretion to prosecutors, and, in
England and Wales at least, consent is often delegated to other
prosecution officials.
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men recording consensual sex acts together as “legitimate
targets” is only the most obvious illustration of this issue,
suggesting that this approach to regulation is both harm-
ful (it treats some users of queer pornography as collateral
damage) and ineffective at identifying plausible sources
of violence against women (cf. Attwood and Smith 2010).
Context, Not Content
Having noted the dangers of criminal law, I should ac-
knowledge where a Millian approach endorses state in-
tervention. I propose that it is not the content but the
context of the creation and publication of pornography
that should be decisive. The question is whether a par-
ticular pornographic expression constitutes “a positive
instigation to some mischievous act” (Mill 1977a, 260).
The test here is a combination of the intent and likely ef-
fects (the illocutionary and perlocutionary elements) of
the expression. AMillian supports freedom of speech but
not freedomof speech act (Jacobson 1995; Langton 2009b;
cf. Zivi 2014).4 With respect to possession, this excludes
pornographycreated throughcoercivemeans for the same
reason that liberals support bans on child pornography,
which records individuals who are incapable of consent-
ing to sex (Strossen 2007, 141). This justifies proscribing
pornography that records real acts to which a participant
does not consent or cannot consent.
On the publication side, we should not read free
speech absolutism into a Millian framework. As well as
a right to access ideas, being able to isolate oneself from
certain forms of expression, especially from populist dis-
cussion, may be an important part of cultivating indi-
vidual character and challenging “the moral coercion of
public opinion” (Mill 1977a, 223). In our contemporary
world of instantly accessible and aggressively promoted
digital media, this principle can be extended to ensure
that people can easily avoid exposure to material they do
not wish to see. This renders sexually explicit content, in
the context of public broadcasts, billboards, posters, and
commercial cinemas, but also Internet advertising and
unsolicited material (cf. Williams 1979, 118), subject to
legitimate regulation. This does not infringe upon expres-
sion rights. Free expression, on my interpretation, means
that individuals need both freedom to access pornogra-
phy and, equally importantly, freedom from unwanted
exposure to pornography.
4This has parallels with contemporary U.S. First Amendment ju-
risprudence, which allows for regulating expression (a complete
free-for-all is inconceivable, as speech rights understood that ex-
tensively would inevitably conflict with each other), but follows a
norm against content discrimination (Weinstein 2009).
In addition, a Millian approach supports vigorous
prosecution, or powerful civil remedies, wherever porno-
graphic expression is used to target and harm specific
individuals. In other words, when pornographic material
is deployed with the intent or the effect of encouraging
criminal acts, including inducing fear and harassment or
assault of women and others, then it is rightly restricted
and very wrong to ignore. A paradigmatic example of this
is the phenomenonof “revenge porn,”where perpetrators
shame and threaten victims with compromising images
published on the Internet (Henry and Powell 2015). A
Millian endorses criminal penalties for those sharing ex-
plicit images that violate the privacy of those depicted,
or designed to cause distress to specific individuals. Le-
gitimate penalties extend to individuals hosting sites or
otherwise facilitating or commercially benefiting from
these acts.
In this sense, from a Millian perspective, individuals
are often overregulated by having their private, consen-
sual activities subject to criminal prosecution, but also
underregulated due to a lack of access to legal remedies
for harmful, nonconsensual acts committed using explicit
imagery.
More Speech, Better Speech,
and Voluntary Action
While a Millian endorses regulation when appropriate,
some social problems are not readily amenable to crim-
inal justice. A Millian seeks out “other instruments to
persuade people to their good, than whips and scourges,
either of the literal or the metaphorical sort” (Mill 1977a,
277). She, along with Cornell, is “suspicious of overre-
liance on law” (2000, 553). While some very bad, re-
actionary, and misogynist ideas are expressed in some
pornographic texts, aMillian response to bad ideas is gen-
erally not to restrict them but to permit more and better
expression to contest them.While Dyzenhaus (1992a) re-
jects this optimism that the best ideas will win out, in the
case of extreme pornography, there are signs that confi-
dence in more, and freer, expression is effective at chal-
lenging prevailing sexist norms rather than reinforcing
them, a strategy of “unleashing the feminine imaginary,
rather than constraining men” (Cornell 2000, 553).
The pro-censorship approach, almost without excep-
tion, treats the variety, and deviancy, of sexual expression
that the Internet has permitted as a problem that requires
urgent criminal regulation (Smith andAttwood2013, 43).
Hartley notes, by contrast, that the decentralizednature of
the Internet disrupts the homogenous and heteronorma-
tive products and processes of the existing pornography
MILLIAN LIBERALISM AND EXTREME PORNOGRAPHY 517
industry, leaving more space for personal, and radical,
expression:
Piracy and the Internet have severely diminished
the profitability of traditional business models,
while also creating access for other view-
points. . . . [P]reviously marginalised people
now have access to the means of production.
Rather than being treated as some kind of freak
show, pierced, tattoed, disabled, queer and
trans folk can now make movies that speak
to their sensibilities and create communities
that support and foster them and their sexual
relations. (2013, 235)
Of course, part of the attraction of pornography, par-
ticularly for young people, emerges from the failure of
government to provide effective sex education, and the
fact that sexual health information is sometimes deliber-
ately suppressed. Unlike extending and escalating crimi-
nal penalties (Bumiller 2013, 201), access to sex education
is associated with reductions in harmful sexual activity,
including, critically, instances of nonvolitional sexual en-
counters (Macdowall et al. 2015). There is thus a signifi-
cant opportunity to reduce the harms of sexual violence,
yet this approach is often ignored because it lies outside
the paradigm of criminal justice.
It is with respect to education that protecting sexu-
ally explicitmedia canbeparticularly important (Strossen
2000, 163–66). McGlynn and Ward are keen to dismiss
the putative value of extreme pornography in stark terms,
arguing simply that “some speech is ‘high-value’” and
some is “low-value.” The screams of pain and misery
that tend to accompany images of extreme pornography
fall into the latter category” (McGlynn and Ward 2009,
350). With this image, McGlynn and Ward risk reduc-
ing participants in the creation of extreme pornography
to essentially silenced victims, literally (in this case) in-
capable of intelligible speech. However, real participants
and producers of extreme pornography have a life out-
side of the texts they produce (and frequently perform
more complex roles within them). Alternative feminist
and queer approaches include the perspectives of both
producers and consumers of pornography in their con-
siderations. As a result, Cornell argues for a feminism that
treats “women, including porn workers, as selves individ-
uated enough to have undertaken the project of becoming
persons. To treat women in the industry as reducible to
hapless victims unworthy of solidarity refuses them that
basic respect” (2000, 552).
Attwood, summing up recent empirical research,
identifies pornography as variously “a source of knowl-
edge, a resource for intimate practices, a site for identity
construction, and an occasion for performing gender
and sexuality” (2005, 65). Hartley, as both a producer
and researcher of pornography, affirms the value of
these kinds of expressions: “As a porn performer I
can express myself as both artist and scientist” (2013,
231). She acknowledges, in particular, the educative
role that pornography with extreme themes can have:
“Some porn, particularly porn that is more focussed
on mutual pleasure in whatever form—including those
that challenge conventional notions of pleasure, like
consensual BDSM—can be of instructional value” (2013,
233). As “essentially live-action cartoons burlesquing
social conventions” (Hartley 2013, 234), pornographic
texts can be politically and socially challenging commen-
tary (cf. Brown 2002). Just because content is sexually
arousing does not render it incapable of generating
critical reflection. Since violent and extreme behaviors
and ideas are a feature of both society and many people’s
imaginations, it is inevitable that some pornographic
material will reflect that in the form of extreme themes.
Ward argues that her engagement and consumption
of pornography is not mere enjoyment but an important
opportunity for self-development and spiritual reflection:
“I cultivate a private, internal space where I can honour
and observe the complexity of my sexuality as it evolves.
Though I remain publicly accountable, I provide myself
with moments of exploratory freedom, creative license,
and orgasmic surprises” (2013, 139; cf. Donner 1993,
163). In addition, Green (2000; 2005, 496) notes how
antipornography feminist theory can ignore the positive
role it has in supporting the formation of gay identities,
often in the absence of public recognition.
These experiences and analyses urge us to include
pornography within the presumptive (not absolute) pro-
tection that a Millian approach extends to discussion and
opinion of all things “practical or speculative, scientific,
moral, or theological” (Mill 1977a, 225). Such expression
is part of “framing theplanof our life to suit our ownchar-
acter: of doing as we like, subject to such consequences
as may follow . . . even though [others] should think our
conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong” (1977a, 226; cf. Zivi
2006, 57).
Of course, a Millian is not only concerned with the
potential harms associated with pornography in wider
society, but also with abuse and coercion within insti-
tutions. She acknowledges the legitimacy of regulation
wherever pecuniary interests are involved, even in cases
where violent coercion is not present: “Fornication,
for example, must be tolerated, and so must gambling;
but should a person be free to be a pimp, or to keep a
gambling-house?’ (1977a, 296). Acknowledging that a
great deal of pornography still uses paid actors rather than
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performance artists, or private individuals expressing
their own ideas, a Millian approach certainly endorses
the regulation of the commercial pornography industry,
including health and safety regulations, and outright
prohibition on paying for some harmful activities.
At the same time, a Millian approach acknowledges
the possibility, and potential superiority, of voluntary al-
ternatives to direct state regulation. Reeves notes thatMill
remarked inoneofhis lesswell-knownessays, “oncentral-
isation” (1977b, 579), “on the need to protect voluntary
organisations and local initiative—vital incubators of lib-
erty and diversity—from the power of the central state”
(Reeves 2007, 51). Similarly, Bumiller argues that the very
strength of some feminist projects against domestic vio-
lence has been their ability to keep an often hostile state,
and other hierarchical forms of power, at arm’s length
(2013, 193). AsCornell finds, feminist activismwithin the
pornography industry has found success in campaigns for
unionization and self-organization, and these have done
more to achieve improvements in real welfare and work-
ing conditions than state-led approaches that too often
treat “‘women in the industry as if they were incapable of
asserting their own personhood” (2000, 552). Thus, there
have been successes, but there is much more for activists
to do. The strength of Millian rights is that they gener-
ate spaces for individuals to combine and act together to
address harms within an industry, or a sector of society,
without the permission of state officials.
Against this stance, which supports spaces where va-
rieties of consensual sexuality can be protected and ex-
plored, McGlynn and Ward argue that Mill’s personal
ethical position is “intrinsically aligned to his idea of the
individual as a progressive, morally and intellectually im-
provable, being” (2014, 508) and that he was “troubled
by the meaning and role of sexual activity in society”
(2014, 509). Reeves suggests that this particular vision of
Mill as an “ascetic, dry, humourless, sexless, lofty intellec-
tual” (2007, 47) is an unjustified caricature. Regardless,
a contemporary understanding of the Millian framework
can certainly encompass a vision of autonomy that recog-
nizes sexual exploration as an important, reflective part
of a reasonable life plan for a great many individuals.
Conclusion
I contribute to the growing debate about the regulation of
adult pornography, particularly in light of the recent pro-
hibition of “extreme pornography” in the United King-
dom. I have shown that a case for censorship is hard
to sustain within a recognizably Millian framework, and
that this framework ismore informative about the protec-
tions afforded to individuals than critics have sometimes
claimed.McGlynn andWard claim that “there is a strong,
liberal basis for pornography regulation” (2014, 521). In
an important sense, this is absolutely true, acknowledged
even in the Williams (1979) report that initiated this de-
bate. Just because material is pornographic does not ex-
clude it from the ordinary regulation of a liberal society.
When pornography is used to threaten or harm individ-
uals or groups, like any other form of expression, legal
remedies are essential. What I have shown here is that
there is not a plausible understanding of the Millian ap-
proach that makes sexually explicit discussion, fictional
depictions, or simple records of consenting adult sexual
activity specifically less deserving of protection than other
formsof expression.Moreover, affirming these rights pro-
vides resources for addressing the harms of some forms
of pornography.
We should affirm a Millian framework of rights not
by faithfully interpreting abstract rights, but because this
approach can practically frame legislation that constrains
authorities fromusing their powers inways that aremani-
festly abusive and illiberal. Without those considerations,
it is likely that the law, no matter its intentions, will be,
as even Rackley and McGlynn (2013) acknowledge can
happen, “misunderstood and mis-used.”
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